Evidence Code Section 802: The Neglected Key to Rationalizing the California Law of Expert Testimony by Imwinkelried, Edward J. & Faigman, David L.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-2009
Evidence Code Section 802: The Neglected Key to
Rationalizing the California Law of Expert
Testimony
Edward J. Imwinkelried
David L. Faigman
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward J. Imwinkelried & David L. Faigman, Evidence Code Section 802: The Neglected Key to Rationalizing the California Law of Expert
Testimony, 42 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 427 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol42/iss2/3
EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 802:
THE NEGLECTED KEY TO RATIONALIZING
THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY*
Edward J. Imwinkelried* * & David L. Faigman* **
The recent Lockheed Litigation Cases presented the California
Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the law of expert
testimony in that jurisdiction. Unfortunately, although the cases were
pending before the court for several years, the court ultimately
dismissed the case without reaching the merits. One of the important
questions presented was whether California courts may enforce
uncodified restrictions on the admissibility of expert testimony. In the
past, courts have sometimes imposed such limitations without squaring
the limitations with the statutory scheme of the California Evidence
Code. This Article argues that some of those limitations were sensible,
sound restrictions. More importantly, this Article contends that the
reference to "law" in California Evidence Code section 802 empowers
the state's judiciary to enunciate and enforce decisional restrictions.
So construed, section 802 can serve as the basis for rationalizing the
law of expert testimony in California.
California courts probably rely on expert testimony to a greater
extent than any other jurisdiction. In a study supported by the Rand
Corporation, researchers found that 86 percent of the civil trials
conducted in California Superior Courts involved expert testimony.'
On average, there were 3.3 experts per trial.'
* This Article is based in part on the authors' amicus brief in In re Lockheed Litig.
Cases, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762 (Ct. App. 2005), petition for review granted, 110 P.3d 289
(Cal. 2005), petition for review dismissed, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478 (2007).
** Edward J. Imwinkelried is the Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Professor of Law,
University of California, Davis, School of Law.
-* David L. Faigman is the John J. Digardi, Distinguished Professor of Law,
University of California, Hastings College of Law.
1. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113, 1119.
2. Id.
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A recent line of California expert testimony cases, In re
Lockheed Litigation Cases,3 attracted special attention from both the
legal community and the media.' In the coordinated Lockheed
actions, the plaintiffs were former and current employees of
Lockheed who claimed that their illnesses were caused by toxic
chemicals they were exposed to while employed by Lockheed.5 In
order to establish general causation, plaintiffs offered both
epidemiological and animal studies.6 The trial judge, however,
excluded the testimony about the studies
The trial judge barred the epidemiological testimony offered by
Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum on two grounds: (1) the study he submitted
did not yield a relative risk exceeding 2.08 and (2) the study involved
multiple solvents, including some that the plaintiffs had not been
exposed to.9 The epidemiological study also did not investigate
whether exposure to only the chemicals the plaintiffs had come in
contact with would increase the incidence of illness.'0
In addition, the trial judge barred the animal studies testimony."l
The judge faulted that testimony because the plaintiffs' expert failed
to explain why an extrapolation to human beings was warranted
despite the obvious differences in species and dosage.
2
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's
exclusion of testimony regarding both studies. 3 Yet, while the
appellate court concurred with the trial judge's reasoning about the
animal studies, 4 the court disagreed with the trial judge's categorical
position that an epidemiological study falling short of the 2.0
threshold is automatically inadmissible. 5  The appellate court
3. 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762 (Ct. App. 2005), petition for review granted, 110 P.3d 289
(Cal. 2005), petition for review dismissed, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478 (2007).
4. Edward J. Imwinkelried, "Daubert" Tipping Point, NAT'L L.J., July 11, 2005.
5. 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 765-66.
6. Id. at 767.
7. Id. at 767-69.
8. Id. at 775. "A relative risk of 2.0 indicates that the disease was twice as common in the
exposed subjects as in the unexposed subjects." Id.
9. Id. at 774.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 767-69, 779.
12. Id. at 779.
13. Id. at 763.
14. Id. at 779-80.
15. Id. at 774-75.
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advanced the position that an epidemiological study yielding a lower
relative risk could be admissible and that in combination with other
evidence, the study could be legally sufficient to support a finding of
general causation.'6 However, the court concluded that the trial
judge's error was harmless.'7 Instead, the court ruled that the
exclusion of the evidence was justifiable on the alternative ground
that the study involved solvents to which the plaintiffs had not been
exposed. 8
The plaintiffs sought review by the California Supreme Court.'9
In their brief submitted to the court, the appellant-plaintiffs asserted:
In California, the basic requirements for admissibility of
[non-instrumental] expert opinion testimony ... are: (1) the
witness must be qualified as an expert on the subject matter
(Evid. Code § 720); (2) the subject [matter] must be
"sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion
of an expert would assist the trier of fact" (Evid. Code §
801, subd. (a)); and (3) the expert's opinion must be
"[b]ased on matter.., that is of a type that reasonably may
be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the
subject matter to which his testimony relates, unless an
expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis
for his opinion." (Evid. Code § 801, subd. (b), italics
added).
There are no other requirements of the evidence code
for expert testimony. °
The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in conducting a
more extensive substantive review of the expert's underlying
21reasoning. More specifically, the appellants contended that
16. See id. at 775, 777 (the court "express[ed] no opinion as to whether an expert opinion
based solely on an epidemiological study showing relative risk of less than 2.0 can be sufficient
to support a finding of causation," but referred to case law that "supports the proposition that an
epidemiological study showing a relative risk of less 2.0 can play a part in providing reasonable
basis for an opinion of causation when considered together with other matters."). See also In re
Lockheed Litig. Cases, 126 Cal. App. 4th 271, 291.
17. In re Lockheed Litig. Cases, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 774.
18. Id.
19. In re Lockheed Litig. Cases, 110 P.3d 289 (Cal. 2005).
20. Opening Brief of Appellants at 22-23, Aguilar v. Exxon Mobil Corp., Lockheed Litig.
Cases, 110 P.3d 289 (Cal. 2005) (No. B166347), 2005 WL 1871874.
21. Id. at22.
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although under Evidence Code section 801 (b) a California trial judge
may determine whether the proposed expert is relying on a proper
"type" of information, the judge may not inquire whether,
cumulatively, the foundational matters cited by the expert are
sufficient to support his or her opinion.22 Thus, the case raised a
critical, unsettled issue about the scope of a trial judge's substantive
review of the reasoning underlying proffered expert opinions.
In a stunning turn of events in 2007, the Court dismissed review
after the case had been pending before the California Supreme Court
for two years. 23  The apparent explanation is that a majority of
members of the court had stock holdings that they believed required
them to recuse themselves from the case.24 The justices could have
designated pro tem judges to fill out the panel to decide the case, but
they chose not to exercise that option.25 However, the upshot is that
the disposition of the case left this vital evidentiary issue unresolved.
The purpose of this Article is to address this evidentiary issue
and suggest that California Evidence Code section 802 authorizes the
California Supreme Court to empower trial judges to conduct the
type of substantive review that the trial judge undertook in Lockheed.
Part I of this Article demonstrates that the California Supreme Court
has enunciated non-statutory restrictions on the admission of expert
testimony in the past. Part II argues that under Evidence Code
section 802, California courts formally have this authority. Finally,
Part III contends that the California Supreme Court should exercise
this authority by expressly empowering trial judges to conduct a
substantive review of a proffered expert's underlying reasoning.
I. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED
NON-STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
In 1923, the District of Columbia Circuit Court rendered its
decision in Frye v. United States.26 Frye declared that an expert's
underlying theory or technique must be generally accepted "in the
22. Id. at 23-25.
23. In re Lockheed Litig. Cases, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 478 (2007).
24. Mike McKee, Lockheed Case Ends Abruptly, RECORDER, Nov. 5, 2007, available at
http://www.callaw.com.
25. Id.
26. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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particular field in which it belongs" to serve as a basis for admissible
expert testimony.27 The California Supreme Court initially embraced
this general-acceptance standard in 1976 in People v. Kelly.28 The
case involved the instrumental scientific technique of sound
spectrography, otherwise known as voiceprint.29 The court subjected
the technique to the Frye test, even though the Evidence Code did
not contain any language codifying a general-acceptance standard.3"
In its celebrated 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court found that the
Federal Rules of Evidence had not incorporated the Frye standard
and instead adopted a validity test based on its interpretation of rule
702.32 In 1994 in People v. Leahy,33 the California Supreme Court
had occasion to decide whether it would follow the U.S. Supreme
Court's lead and move away from the general-acceptance standard.
Instead, the California court reaffirmed Kelly/Frye by ruling that
when the proponent of the expert testimony proffers novel,
purportedly scientific expert testimony, the proponent must establish
that the expert's underlying theory or technique is generally
accepted.34
In 1998, in People v. Venegas,35 the California Supreme Court
further elaborated on Leahy.36 The Venegas court made it clear that
the proponent must also ordinarily show that the expert used
acceptable procedures in applying the theory or technique to the facts
of the pending case. 37  The court stated that the proffered expert
testimony must satisfy a test with several prongs.38 One prong-the
classic Frye standard-requires the proponent to establish the
reliability of the expert's general theory or technique by proving its
27. Id. at 1014.
28. 549 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (Cal. 1976).
29. Id. at 1242-43.
30. Id. at 1244.
31. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
32. Id. at 587, 592-95..
33. 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994).
34. Id. at 337.
35. 954 P.2d 525 (Cal. 1998).
36. Id. at 542 n.30, 549.
37. Id. at 547.
38. Id. at 545.
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general acceptance.39 A separate prong mandates proof that the
expert employed proper "procedures... in the case at hand.
4°
If the appellants' position in Lockheed was correct, the
California Supreme Court would have to overrule Venegas. In the
case of instrumental scientific techniques, like the use of DNA
evidence, the trial judge must venture beyond a showing that the
expert is relying on a recognized type of study or technique in order
to evaluate the second prong from Venegas.4' The California
Evidence Code is devoid of any language incorporating such a
requirement. 2 On their face, the provisions of the California
Evidence Code make no distinction between instrumental and non-
instrumental scientific techniques such as those employed by
psychiatrists and social scientists.43 If the Evidence Code forbids any
judicial inquiry beyond the general type of information relied on,
then that inquiry must also be barred in the case of techniques such
as DNA typing.'
Admittedly, decisions such as Venegas venture beyond the
requirements expressly set out in the California Evidence Code.
However, the thesis of this Article is that such decisions are
justifiable. As Parts II and III demonstrate, the key to rationalizing
such decisions is California Evidence Code section 802.
Parts II and III explain that whenever an expert attempts to
evaluate the facts of a pending case, he or she explicitly or implicitly
applies a major premise, that is, a general theory or technique.
Section 802 of the California Evidence Code empowers the
California courts to announce restrictions on an expert's major
premise.45 In the past, the California Supreme Court has exercised
that power by prescribing the general acceptance test for purportedly
39. Id. at 545-46.
40. Id. at 547.
41. See id.
42. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 720, 801-802 (West 1995).
43. See id.
44. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges-Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial Judge
Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury's Province to
Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2000).
45. See discussion infra Part 1I.B (stating that the text, context, legislative history, and
maxims of interpretation support the idea that under section 802, a court is empowered to
prescribe these restrictions).
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scientific expert testimony, as it did in Leahy.46 While the court has
not extended Kelly/Frye's general acceptance test to non-scientific
expertise, the court ought to impose sensible restrictions on the
theories and methodologies underlying that type of expertise to
protect the reliability of the fact-finding process. In the past,
California courts have asserted the authority to exclude speculative,
conjectural testimony.47 In the same spirit, authorizing California
trial judges to inquire into whether the proponent's foundational
showing adequately supports the expert's theory or methodology
would be a minimal and reasonable restriction.
II. EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 802 AND NON-STATUTORY
RESTRICTIONS ON THE ADMISSION OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY.
In the Lockheed case, the respondents argued that if Evidence
Code sections 801 and 803 are construed together, they confer on
California judges the power to exclude speculative or conjectural
testimony." The appellants naturally opposed that argument.49 But
neither brief relied on California Evidence Code section 802. We
submit that neglecting section 802 is a grave error. Section 802
furnishes a sound, alternative route to concluding that the California
Supreme Court can empower trial judges to conduct a substantive
review of the reasoning underlying an expert's opinion. Tellingly,
the section-802 route is more faithful to the text of the Evidence
Code. To trace that route, we turn now to the fundamentals of
evidentiary policy and statutory construction.
46. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 337 (Cal. 1994).
47. See People v. Sundlee, 138 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (Ct. App. 1977) ("An expert may not
base his testimony on conjecture .... ").
48. See Brief of Respondents at 19-31, Aguilar v. Exxon Mobil Corp., Lockheed Litig.
Cases, 110 P.3d 289 (Cal. 2005) (No. B166347), 2005 WL 3142597; see also Sundlee, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 834.
49. Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 20.
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A. A General Overview of the Evidence Code
Provisions on Expert Testimony
The typical expert's testimony is syllogistic in nature." For
example, consider the testimony of a mental health expert. The
expert's reasoning can be restated in syllogistic fashion:
1. I am a practicing psychiatrist.
2. As reflected in the American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, there are criteria for
diagnosing schizophrenia, that is, symptoms A, B, and C.
3. This patient's case history includes symptoms A, B, and
C.
4. Therefore, this patient is probably suffering from
schizophrenia.
This model works equally well in the case of other types of
expertise testimony such as instrumental DNA analysis:
1. I am a molecular biologist.
2. If the DNA fragments on two autoradiographs are in the
same position and within acceptable limits of the same
length, then the two samples that have been fragmented
contain the same DNA markers.
3. The DNA fragments on these two autoradiographs are in
the same position and within acceptable limits of the same
length.
4. Therefore, the samples that were fragmented contain the
same DNA markers.
After qualifying as an expert in the first sentence, the witness's
remaining testimony is reducible to a syllogism. The second
sentence is the expert's major premise; it represents the general
theory or technique on which the expert relies. The third sentence
functions as a minor premise; it specifies the case-specific
information to which the expert applies the theory or technique.
Finally, the fourth sentence is the expert's ultimate conclusion,
yielded when the expert applies the major premise to the minor.
In terms of evidentiary policy, there is a fundamental difference
between the expert's major and minor premises. 1  The major
50. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of
Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1, 2 (1988); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Educational
Significance of the Syllogistic Structure of Expert Testimony, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1148 (1993).
EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 802
premise information consists of expert generalizations, such as
scientific propositions. 2 This is the sort of generalization that, in the
past, the courts have subjected to either the Kelly/Frye general
acceptance standard or the Daubert validation test. 3  These
generalizations deserve distinctive evidentiary treatment. First, this
information cannot simply be observed or perceived. Rather, these
generalizations are generated in a particular way, namely, by expert
methodology like controlled experiments or careful, rigorous study
of naturally occurring events. 4 Moreover, these generalizations are
propositions that "transcend[] individual cases."55
The minor premise information is radically different from the
major premise information. 6 This type of fact ordinarily can be
observed. Indeed, at early common law the expert was required to
personally observe a fact before he or she could rely on it as part of
the minor premise supporting the expert's opinion.57 Further, in
contrast to the substance of the major premise, the content of the
minor premise frequently coincides with disputed, case-specific facts
that the jury must ultimately decide-for instance, information
regarding a plaintiffs injury or the events preceding the injury. 8
Given the overlap, when trial judges determine the acceptability of
an expert's minor premise, they ought to confine their inquiry to
whether the "type" of information the expert is relying on is
acceptable. If the judge were to pass on the credibility of the specific
information contained in the expert's minor premise, the judge would
be usurping the jury's role. 9
51. Imwinkelreid, The "Bases " of Expert Testimony, supra note 50, at 13-14.
52. Id. at 2.
53. See I DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 1-118 (2007-2008 ed.).
54. Id. at 119-54.
55. David L. Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 555,
573 (1995).
56. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory of the Structure of
Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 47 MERCER L. REV. 447 (1996); Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The Meaning of "Facts or Data" in Federal Rule of Evidence 703: The Significance
of the Supreme Court's Decision to Rely on Federal Rule 702 in Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 54 MD. L. REV. 352, 353-54 (1995).
57. 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 14-15 (5th ed. 1999).
58. Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony, supra note 50, at 26.
59. See Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory, supra note 56, at 462-65.
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1. The General Statutory Scheme Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence
The federal courts have, in effect, used the syllogistic model
described above to arrive at a sensible interpretive structure for
Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence. To begin with, courts
look to rule 702 to determine whether the witness qualifies as an
expert. By its terms, the statute provides that the witness must be
"qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education . "...60 As we shall see later, post-Daubert, the federal
courts also look to rule 702 to decide whether the expert's major
premise is acceptable.
In contrast, rule 703 controls the propriety of the expert's minor
premise. In pertinent part, that statute reads:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be
admitted.6'
The wording of rule 703 indicates that it applies only to the
expert's minor premise; it speaks to "[t]he facts or data in the
particular case" that the expert is considering.62 Under rule 703, the
expert may rely on three different types of sources for the case-
specific information in his or her minor premise: (1) personally
"perceived" information (e.g., a wound observed by the testifying
physician); (2) information "made known to the expert at ...the
hearing" (e.g., facts included in a hypothetical question posed to a
physician testifying at trial); and (3) information "made known to the
expert... before the hearing" when it is "reasonabl[e]" for the expert
to rely on that type of information (e.g., a nurse's report about the
patient's temperature to the physician).63 Lastly, rule 704 applies to
60. FED. R. EVID. 702.
61. FED. R. EVID. 703.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id.
436
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the phrasing of the expert's ultimate conclusion, partially abolishing
the ultimate fact prohibition'
In Daubert,65 the United States Supreme Court implicitly
recognized the boundary between the expert's major and minor
premises." After holding that Frye v. United States67 is no longer
good law in federal practice, the Court developed a new test."8 The
Court eschewed any reliance on rule 703.69 Rather, the Court
concluded that "[t]he primary locus of [the new standard] is Rule
702, which clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the
subjects and theories about which an expert may testify."
°7
The Court's conclusion was sound as a matter of statutory
interpretation. In statutory interpretation, context is key. Rule 705
supplies part of the context for rule 702. On its face, rule 705
differentiates between the "reasons" for an expert's opinion and "the
underlying facts or data.' Of course, the expression "facts or data"
is drawn directly from the text of rule 703.72 If rule 703 governs that
information (the expert's minor premise), a court must look
elsewhere to decide the soundness of the "reasons" for the opinion,
64. FED. R. EvID. 704. Rule 704 states that:
(a) [e]xcept as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of
the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier
of fact alone.
Id.
65. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (admitting expert's
opinion as reliable because it met the standards of reliability and relevance under the
Federal Rules).
66. Id. at 589 (recognizing that there must be regulation of which subjects and theories an
expert may testify).
67. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that expert's testimony is
acceptable only if his deduction is sufficiently established enough to have gained general
acceptance in the field).
68. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 (adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence test).
69. See id. at 586-595.
70. Id. at 589.
71. FED. R. EvI. 705. The text of rule 705 mandates that: "The expert may testify in terms
of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or
data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination." Id.
72. Fed. R. Evid. 703.
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that is, the theories or techniques serving as the expert's major
premise. The Daubert Court looked elsewhere-to rule 702-and
derived a validity test from that statute.73 The amended version of
rule 702 makes it even clearer that one of its functions is to regulate
the expert's major premise. As amended in 2000, rule 702(2)
requires the proponent to establish that the expert is relying on
"reliable principles and methods. 74
2. The General Statutory Scheme Under the
California Evidence Code
The California Evidence Code provisions on expert testimony
reflect a similar syllogistic model. Like Federal Rule 702, Evidence
Code section 720 explicitly addresses a witness's qualifications as an
expert.75  The Advisory Committee's note to Federal Rule 703
indicates that the federal drafters used California Evidence Code
section 801(b) as the primary model for rule 703.76 Indeed, the
wording of the two statutes is strikingly similar. The key passage in
section 801(b) uses the language, "perceived by or personally known
to the witness or made known to him at or before the hearing."77
73. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588-89.
74. FED. R. EVID. 702(2). Rule 702(2) mandates that:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods ....
Id.
75. CAL. EVID. CODE § 720 (West 1995). Rule 720 mandates that:
(a) A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject
to which his testimony relates. Against the objection of a party, such special
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education must be shown before the witness
may testify as an expert.
(b) A witness' special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may be
shown by any otherwise admissible evidence, including his own testimony.
Id.
76. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
77. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b) (West 1995). Rule 801(b) mandates that:
If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited
to such an opinion as is:
(b) Based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and
education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at
or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may
Winter 2009] EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 802
That language is virtually identical to the wording of Federal Rule
703, governing the expert's minor premise.78 Section 805 is the
analogue to Federal Rule 704, and like Rule 704, section 805
overturns the ultimate fact prohibition on the phrasing of the expert's
final opinion.79 Of course, the remaining component of the expert's
reasoning process is the major premise. As we shall see, section 802
authorizes a case law limitation on the major premise of a non-
scientific expert. °
B. The Specific Role of Evidence Code Section 802
in the Statutory Scheme
The text of California Evidence Code section 802, its context in
the California Evidence Code, the related legislative history, and
even maxims of interpretation support the conclusion that under
section 802 a court may prescribe case law restrictions on the
expert's major premise.
be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his
testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a
basis for his opinion.
Id.
78. FED. R. EVID. 703 reads:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or
data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent
of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in
assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.
Id. (emphasis added).
79. CAL. EVID. CODE § 805 (West 1995). Rule 805 reads:
Testimony in the form of an opinion that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable
because it embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Id. It was
often said that the common law barred expert opinions coinciding with an ultimate
issue in the case, but section 805 states that an otherwise admissible opinion "is not
objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
Id.
80. See discussion infra Part III.A (stating that the trial judge can weigh the credibility of a
non-scientific expert's testimony when determining whether an expert's major premise is
admissible).
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1. The Statutory Text
Section 802 states that an expert "testifying in the form of an
opinion may state on direct examination the reasons for his
opinion.., unless he is precluded by law from using such
reasons . . . as a basis for his opinion."'" The statutory text is
unquestionably broad enough to support the interpretation that a
court may announce non-statutory substantive restrictions, that is, the
expert's general theory or technique. The statutory term "reason" is
expansive enough to include an expert theory or technique. If so,
section 802 can be construed as applying to the expert's major
premise.
2. The Statutory Context
When interpreting any statute under California law, it is
important to consider the particular provision's statutory context.
Specifically, other parts of a legislative scheme should be considered
as they are the fundamental tool used to help decipher the meaning of
any statute.8 ' Here, the other statutory provisions on expert
testimony point to the interpretation of section 802 as extending to
the expert's major premise. Two other statutory provisions,
Evidence Code sections 801 and 160, shed important light on the
meaning of section 802. 83
To begin with, the wording of section 802 contrasts sharply with
that of section 801. Although section 801(b) limits the judicial
inquiry to the "type" of information that the expert relies on, there is
no such restriction in section 802.84 Moreover, while section 802
refers to "the reason" for the expert's opinion as well as "the matter
upon which [his opinion] is based," section 801 mentions only the
latter." When a legislature uses different terms in two different
statutes, the sensible assumption is that the legislature meant
different things.86 The "reasons" for the opinion, mentioned in
section 802, must be something other than "the matter upon which
[the] opinion is based," the minor premise governed by section
81. CAL. EVID. CODE § 802 (West 1995).
82. Hicks v. E.T. Legg & Assocs., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10, 17 (Ct. App. 2001).
83. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 160, 801 (West 1995).
84. See id. §§ 801(b), 802.
85. See id. §§ 801-802.
86. Kray Cabling Co. v. County of Contra Costa, 46 Cal. Rptr.2d 674, 676 (Ct. App. 1995).
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801(b). The stark contrast between the wording of the two statutes
strongly suggests that although under section 801(b) the judge may
consider only the acceptability of the generic type of information the
expert relies on, the judge is not so limited under section 802.
As previously stated, it makes eminently good sense to restrict
the scope of the judicial inquiry under section 801(b). In that
subdivision, the language, "perceived by or personally known to the
witness or made known to him at or before the hearing," speaks to
the propriety of the expert's minor premise.87  Much of the
information included in the minor premise overlaps with case-
specific issues that the jury must decide.8 Section 801(b) restricts
the extent of the judicial inquiry into the minor premise to determine
whether the generic "type" of information is permissible.89 If the
trial judge were allowed to go further and pass on the credibility of
the specific information contained in the expert's minor premise, the
judge would be intruding on the role of the petit jurors.9"
Even more importantly, California Evidence Code section 160
serves as part of the context of section 802. Again, section 802 states
that an expert may be "precluded by law from using . . . [a]
reason[]... as a basis for his opinion."9 The Evidence Code sets out
a statutory definition of "law" in section 160. Section 160 reads:
"'Law' includes constitutional, statutory, and decisional law." 92 As
the California Law Revision Commission Comment to section 160
explains, "[t]his definition makes it clear that a reference to 'law'
includes the law established by judicial decisions."93  Just as
Evidence Code section 1200 on hearsay refers to "law," section 802
contains an identical reference.94 In numerous cases, the California
courts have relied on section 160 as a basis for recognizing hearsay
exceptions that are not expressly enumerated in the statutes.95 By the
87. CAL. EvID. CODE § 801(b).
88. lmwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory, supra note 56, at 462-65.
89. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b).
90. Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory, supra note 56, at 462-65.
91. CAL. EvID. CODE § 802.
92. Id. § 160.
93. Id.. § 160 cmt.
94. Id. § 802.
95. See In re Cindy L., 947 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Cal. 1997) (explaining that there are some
references to "law" that include judicial decisions, as well as constitutional and statutory
provisions); In re Carmen 0., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848, 855 (Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing a "child
Winter 2009]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW [Vol. 42:427
same token, construed in the context of section 160, section 802
authorizes a court to promulgate case law restrictions on an expert's
''reasons" or major premise.
3. The Extrinsic Legislative History
The California Law Revision Commission Comments to the
statutory scheme lead to the twin conclusions that section 801
regulates primarily the expert's minor premise and that the California
Supreme Court may prescribe non-statutory limitations on the major
premise under section 802.96 The Comments to section 801 give
numerous examples of the type of information that the statute
regulates. The Comments include the following passages:
"For example, a physician may rely on statements made to
him by the patient concerning the history of his condition."
"A physician may ... rely on reports and opinions of other
physicians."
"An expert on the valuation of real or personal property...
may rely on inquiries made of others ......
"[A]n expert on automobile accidents may not rely on
extrajudicial statements of others as a partial basis as to the
point of impact. .. ."
"[A] report of [a] fire ranger as to cause of fire [was] held
inadmissible because it was based primarily upon
statements made to him by other persons."97
The common denominator of the overwhelming majority of the
examples set out in the Comments is that they all refer to minor
premise information, case-specific data that the expert will evaluate
dependency hearsay exception"); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., CALIFORNIA EVIDENTIARY
FOUNDATIONS 410-13 (3d ed. 2000); MIGUEL A. MENDEZ, EVIDENCE: THE CALIFORNIA CODE
AND THE FEDERAL RULES-A PROBLEM APPROACH 437 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the need for a
hearsay exception).
96. CAL. EVID. CODE § 160 cmt.
97. Id. § 801 cmt. (citations omitted).
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by invoking a general theory or technique. 98 Indeed, the Comments
expressly state that the statutory requirements in section 801(b) are
intended to ensure that the expert is adequately acquainted "with the
facts of a particular case." 99  The language in section 801(b),
beginning with "perceived by," was never intended to regulate the
expert's major premise.
The Comments go further, expressly disavowing any intent to
set out "a detailed statutory rule that lists all" the restrictions on
experts.' 0 Rather, the Comments state that section 801(b) sets out
only "the minimum requisites that must be met in every case.'' The
Comments elaborate:
[A]n expert may not base his opinion upon any matter that
is declared by the constitutional, statutory, or decisional law
of this State to be an improper basis for an opinion.0 2
The Comments continue, adding that "the courts ... are free to
continue to develop" non-statutory restrictions on expert testimony
so long as they are consistent with the express provisions of the
statutes.'03
4. The Canons or Maxims of Interpretation
On occasion in statutory interpretation, the California courts go
beyond text, context, and legislative history and invoke the canons of
interpretation. One of the well-settled canons of interpretation in
California is that whenever possible, the courts should reject an
interpretation that leads to absurd consequences."
The proposed construction of sections 801 and 802 restricting
judicial inquiry to only the "type" of method used by an expert
would result in such consequences. Consider the following
98. See id.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See People v. Ledesma, 939 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Cal. 1997) ("[T]he intent prevails over the
letter .... ) (citation omitted); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 30 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 606, 612 (Ct. App. 2005) (discussing the primary goal of giving effect to the intent of the
Legislature and avoiding a literal interpretation that would lead to "an absurd result"); Pang v.
Beverly Hosp., Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 648 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating that interpretation
must be "practical").
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hypothetical, a variation of the facts in Daubert. In a pesticide case,
the plaintiffs call an epidemiologist as an expert. Preliminarily, the
expert testifies along the following lines: there are thirty published
studies involving 130,000 patients; every study yielded the finding
that the relative risk was only 1.0; the incidence of cancer in the
exposed group was no higher than the incidence of the disease in the
general population; the expert conducted a metanalysis of the
studies; and that metanalysis also yielded the finding that the relative
risk is no higher. Yet, based solely on the epidemiological study, the
expert is prepared to testify to the validity of the general theory that
exposure to the pesticide causes cancer.
Of course, given this data, no reputable epidemiologist would
testify to that ultimate opinion." 5 In the face of that foundational
testimony, the receipt of that opinion would make the California
courts a laughingstock. Yet, a restrictive interpretation seemingly
mandates the acceptance of that opinion so long as the expert
purports to rely on a proper "type" of research, namely, an
epidemiological study.1"6 The restrictive interpretation would tie the
courts' hands and preclude them from conducting any substantive
review of the expert's reasoning.
III. THE ENUNCIATION OF CASE "LAW" RULE THAT TRIAL JUDGES
MUST INQUIRE WHETHER THE PROPONENT'S FOUNDATIONAL
SHOWING ADEQUATELY SUPPORTS
"THE REASON[] FOR HIS [OR HER] OPINION." ''"7
A. The Court Should Ensure the Reliability ofAll Expert Testimony,
Not Merely the Instrumental Scientific Testimony
Governed by Kelly/Frye
California litigants make very extensive use of expert
testimony."8 As the introduction noted, in a study funded by the
Rand Corporation, researchers reviewed 529 California civil trials.0 9
105. See Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 348-49 (Fern M. Smith ed., Fed. Judicial Ctr. 2d. 2000)
(discussing the relative risk approach).
106. See id. at 335-36.
107. CAL. EVID CODE § 802 (West 1995).
108. Gross, supra note 1 at 1119.
109. Id.
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Experts testified in 86 percent of the trials."l° Only a small minority
of the experts testified based on instrumental scientific techniques of
the sort governed by Kelly/Frye. The vast majority of the trials
involved other types of expertise. ' 12  Thus, the issue posed in the
majority of cases is not only recurring; it is of even greater practical
importance than the admissibility standards for instrumental
scientific techniques as prescribed by Kelly/Frye.
There is no justification for confining a substantive review of the
expert's reasoning to cases involving testimony governed by
Kelly/Frye. The statutes themselves make no such distinction.
Evidence Code section 801 refers generically to testimony by an
"expert.""' 3 On their face, none of the pertinent Evidence Code
provisions is restricted to the species of expertise controlled by
Kelly/Frye. On expert testimony issues such as those presented in
Kelly and Leahy, the California Supreme Court has mandated an
inquiry into the reliability of the theories and techniques underlying
instrumental scientific testimony through an examination of the
general acceptance of those theories and techniques." 4 If those
decisions are still good law, there must be a similar mandate that
California trial judges likewise police the reliability of the major
premises used by other types of experts. In terms of evidentiary
policy, there certainly is no justification to restrict the requirement to
instrumental scientific testimony." 5
As has been noted in previous articles,16 complaints about "junk
science" have tended to overshadow criticism of nonscientific expert
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. Id. ("Half of the experts... were medical doctors, and an additional 9 percent were other
medical professionals-clinical psychologists, rehabilitation specialists, dentists, etc.").
113. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1995).
114. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal. 1994) (stating that theories and techniques
"must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs" (citations omitted)); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976)
(demonstrating reliability "require[s] a preliminary showing of general acceptance of the new
technique in the relevant scientific community." (citations omitted)).
115. Miguel A. M~ndez, II. Expert Testimony and the Opinion Rule: Conforming the
Evidence Code to the Federal Rules, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 411, 421-22, 433 (2003) (discussing that
the role of the court is not to determine reliability as a scientific matter).
116. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly
Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15
CARDOZO L. REv. 2271, 2279-80 (1994) (citations omitted).
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testimony, although such evidence is just as suspect."1 7 If anything,
there is an even greater threat of inaccurate information coming from
nonscientific expert testimony than from "junk science" because the
very nature of scientific evidence helps to assure a likelihood of
accuracy."' While scientific evidence can usually be double-checked
by other scientists for error or contributing factors,"1 9 there is
generally no such double-check for nonscientific testimony.
B. Requiring California Trial Judges to Conduct This
Inquiry Poses Only a Minimal Threat to the Role
and Power of the Petit Jurors.
By mandating judicial inquiry into the reliability of an expert's
major premise, California would be taking a step in the direction of
the federal approach to evaluating the admissibility of expert
testimony. However, it must be remembered that even under that
federal approach, there are safeguards to protect the jury's role. 2 ° A
federal judge determining admissibility under Federal Rule 104(a)
considers only the foundational testimony. As the Advisory
Committee Note to the 2000 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence
702 emphasizes, even under Daubert a federal trial judge is not to
determine whether the expert's ultimate opinion itself is "correct." ''
The California Supreme Court can put the same safeguards in place
in California.
Moreover, in conducting the proposed inquiry under the
Evidence Code, a California trial judge would be playing a much
narrower role than the role assigned to federal judges under Daubert.
In Daubert, the Court expressly stated that Federal Rule of Evidence
104(a) governs the judge's determination as to whether the
proponent has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the
expert has validated his or her theory or technique by sound
117. See Phylis S. Bamberger, The Dangerous Expert Witness, 52 BROOK L. REV. 855
(1986).
118. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Comparative Law Analysis of the Standard for Admitting
Scientific Evidence: The United States Stands Alone, 42 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 15, 23 (1989).
119. See generally 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE at ch. 15, 25 (2d ed. 1993) (examining the requirements and background of the
presentation of scientific evidence).
120. See lmwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory, supra note 56, at 462-65.
121. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
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scientific methodology. 122  When a federal judge determines the
existence of a foundational fact under Rule 104(a), "the judge acts as
trier of fact .... If the question is factual in nature, the judge will of
necessity receive evidence pro and con on the issue.' 23 When the
proponent and opponent submit conflicting testimony about the
disputed foundational fact, a federal trial judge can consider the
credibility of the testimony and resolve the dispute on the basis of a
credibility determination. 124 In Huddleston v. United States, 25 the
Supreme Court contrasted rules 104(a) and 104(b) by stating that
under the latter statute the trial judge does not "weigh[]
credibility."'26
In the Lockheed Litigation Cases, the trial judge barred Dr.
Teitelbaum's testimony, which was squarely based on a 1989
study. 27 The trial judge did not preclude the testimony because the
respondents had submitted competing studies reaching conflicting
findings, which the judge found more convincing than the 1989
study.'28 Rather, the judge focused solely on the study cited by Dr.
Teitelbaum and found that it furnished inadequate support for his
theory that exposure to the five chemicals supplied by Exxon and
Unocal causes cancer. 129 The trial judge's ruling was not based on a
credibility determination. As Justice Kitching explained in the
appellate court's opinion:
The 1989 study reviewed epidemiological studies of
painters who potentially were exposed to more than 130
different chemicals and other substances . . . . Dr.
Teitelbaum acknowledged that some of the chemicals the
subjects were exposed to were known carcinogens ....
The study showed that painters who potentially were
exposed to a long list of more than 130 substances and
thousands of chemical compounds contracted cancer at a
rate greater than the national average. The study did not
122. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
123. FED. R. EvID. 104(a) advisory committee's note (amended 2000).
124. In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 156 (3d Cir. 1999).
125. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
126. Id. at 690.
127. In re Lockheed Litig. Cases, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 2004).
128. Id. at 38.
129. Id.
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indicate, however, whether persons exposed to only the five
chemicals supplied by Exxon and Union Oil contracted
cancer at a rate greater than the national average, because
the study subjects were exposed to many other chemicals,
including known carcinogens. Dr. Teitelbaum's opinion..
. therefore was based on conjecture and speculation. .30
To borrow a phrase from the United States Supreme Court's
decision in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,3' Dr. Teitelbaum's theory
was connected to the existing data in the 1989 study only by the
"ipse dixit of the expert."'32  A court may conclude that there is
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered.'33 When the "connection" between the data and the
opinion is the expert's conjecture or speculation, the foundation is
inadequate. Permitting this sort of limited judicial inquiry will not
imperil the independence or power of California jurors.
IV. CONCLUSION
To be candid, the language of the Evidence Code is less than
crystal clear. Quite frankly, the Law Revision Commission's reports
suggest that the drafters did not fully appreciate either (1) the
diversity of types of expertise, or (2) the fundamental distinction
between an expert's general theory or technique (his or her major
premise) and the case-specific data that the expert considers (the
minor premise). Nevertheless, as this Article demonstrates, the text
of the Evidence Code is amenable to a sensible interpretation.
Again, the key provision is section 802.'
On its face, the major clause in section 801(b) may be limited to
the "matter" on which the opinion is based, but section 802 refers to
both that type of information and "the reasons for his opinion."'35 In
light of the broader wording of section 802, it is necessary to
recognize the important distinction between the expert's major and
minor premises. Further, while section 801(b) strictly limits the
judicial inquiry to whether the expert is relying on a reasonable
130, Id.
131. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
132. Id. at 146.
133. Id.
134. CAL. EVID CODE § 802 (West 1995).
135. Id.
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"type" of information, there is no such limitation in section 802.
Section 802 thus authorizes a more probing judicial inquiry into the
expert's major premise. Finally, section 802 expressly recognizes
that the "law" may preclude an expert from relying on a particular
"reason" for an opinion. In light of the statutory definition of "law"
in section 160,136 a court unquestionably has the power to render
decisions such as Venegas37 and prescribe non-statutory limitations
on the expert's major premise.
As the Rand study documents, 38 the type of instrumental
scientific evidence governed by Kelly/Frye and Venegas represents
only a small percentage of the expert testimony presented in
California courtrooms. It is equally clear that other species of expert
testimony can pose the same dangers of unreliability as instrumental
scientific evidence. Thus, under section 802, trial judges may, and
must, determine whether, as a matter of logic, the studies and other
information cited by experts adequately support the conclusion that
the expert's general theory or technique is valid.
California trial judges are competent to conduct this type of
circumscribed inquiry into the sufficiency of the foundational
testimony supporting an expert's major premise. We routinely
permit California trial judges to make analogous evaluations. For
example, trial judges evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on the
historical merits in the context of pretrial summary judgment
motions and directed verdict motions at trial. Those determinations
have an even greater impact on the outcome of the case. Those
determinations entail evaluations of the substantive evidence on the
merits of the case, not merely foundational testimony. Furthermore,
those decisions can have far more drastic procedural consequences.
California trial judges are also equal to the task of conducting a
critical inquiry into the sufficiency of expert foundational testimony.
After all, as the late Sir Karl Popper himself remarked, the scientific
method is essentially "commonsense writ large."' 39
136. Id. § 160.
137. 954 P.2d 525 (Cal. 1998).
138. Gross, supra note 1 at 1119.
139. KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 22 (1959).
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